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Attention to the city regional scale has fluctuated over time as governments in different countries 
have sought new ‘territorial fixes’ to respond to changing systems of production, flows of goods, 
capital and information, environmental challenges, and demands for renewed political legitimacy of 
collective action. In England, there have been successive cycles of rescaling, particularly since the 
1970s when metropolitan governance structures were created only to be abolished the following 
decade.  Larger regional territories were favoured in the 1990s and 2000s, however, from the mid-
2000s onwards the city-regional scale again rose to prominence. The 2010s saw attention shift back 
to sub-regional territories with the creation of ‘Combined Authorities’ for ‘larger than local’ but 
‘smaller than regional’ areas, including for many city-regions.  This paper considers the new city 
regionalism in England and the experience of the Liverpool City Region (LCR).  It concludes that whilst 
exogenous political economic factors and state strategies may stimulate rescaling of territorial 
governance, it is important to recognise that it is also shaped by distinctive local contexts and 
practices.   
 





1.0 Introduction  
 
City regionalism is currently enjoying a renaissance in many countries (Jones et al., 2015 p.6, 
Sturzaker and Nurse, 2020, Demazière and Sykes, 2019). Attention to this strategic scale has 
fluctuated over time as states have sought new ‘territorial fixes’ (Deas, 2014) in response to 
changing systems of production, flows of goods, capital and information, environmental 
challenges, and demands from citizens for renewed legitimacy to underpin collective action. 
In the United Kingdom there have been successive cycles of territorial reform, particularly 
since the 1970s.  Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the creation of the 
Greater London Authority are key changes. In England, outside London the pattern of reform 
has been less consistent with more frequent shifts in the scalar focus. Metropolitan 
governments were created in the 1970s only to be abolished by the mid-1980s. From the 
1990s into the early part of the 2000s larger regional territories were favoured (Jones and 
McCleod, 1999). The city-regional scale then returned to prominence both in the work of 
researchers and through initiatives driven by local government cooperation in certain large 
metropolitan areas – notably Manchester (Hodson et al., 2020). In the 2010s the emphasis on 
sub-regional territories was accentuated with the creation of ‘Combined Authorities’ for 
‘larger than local’ but ‘smaller than regional’ areas, notably many city regions (Harrison, 
2012). These shifts have redefined the key scales and sites at which certain competences are 
concentrated and exercised. They have been driven both by a combination of ‘exogenous’ 
structural shifts and state-strategy, and endogenous dynamics within territories. The present 
paper engages principally with the second of these drivers through a consideration of the 
experience of the Liverpool City Regions (LCR) in adapting to the ‘new city regionalism’ in 
England.  The paper firstly reviews the evolution of sub-state government in England from the 
reforms of the 19th. Century through to the creation of Combined Authorities (CAs) in the 
2010s. Secondly, it situates the new city regionalism in England  against its wider context and 
identifies a set of analytical themes.  Thirdly, the experience of the Liverpool City Region (LCR) 
in adapting to the new city regionalism is considered in light of these. This account is 
supported by a review of published materials and an interview with the leader of the team 
developing the new Spatial Development Strategy (SDS) for the city region. Finally, the 
conclusion considers the extent to which exogenous political economic factors and (nation) 
state strategies and practices in given localities interact in the rescaling of territorial 
governance.   
 
2.0 Historical Background  
 
2.1 Scaling-up local government to meet the requirements of an urban nation (1888 – 
1972) 
 
In the 19th century England experienced rapid urbanisation and structures of local 
government were reformed to address the representative, economic, social and physical 
needs of expanding urban areas (Briggs, 1963, Hunt, 2005). Thus ‘The Local Government Acts 
of 1888 and 1894 introduced a comprehensive pattern of county councils, and district and 
parish councils’ and the 1888 Act created “61 ‘county boroughs’, large or historically 
significant urban areas falling outside county council administration” (Sandford, 
2019)(Sandford, 2019, p.6). This system which was to remain largely unchanged (though with 
some boundary changes, Dockerill, 2020) until the final third of the 20th. century. The 1930s 
and 1940s saw reflection, on the regional, industrial and planning issues facing the UK. The 
Barlow Report (1940) considered the distribution of the industrial population; the Uthwatt 
Report compensation and betterment (1942); the Scott Committee (1942) rural land use, and, 
in the same decade Patrick Abercrombie prepared his two plans for London.  The later 1940s 
saw the introduction of a comprehensive planning system and the state also pursued a new 
towns programme and regional policy (Alexander, 2009).  Yet it has been argued that ‘most 
of the period from 1945 to 1974 was distinguished by the perpetuation of a fragmented 
system of local government and planning’ and that this ‘worked against the capacity to plan 
metropolitan regions as a whole, and also frequently divided responsibility for homogenous 
metropolitan areas between urban and shire authorities’ (Roberts et al., 1999).  The Herbert 
Commission on local government in London (1960); the Redcliffe-Maud Commission on local 
government in England (Wise, 1969); and, the Wheatley report on local government in 
Scotland (1969) were to lead to a sequence of reforms in response. A Greater London Council 
(GLC) was established in 1964 and major reform under the Local Government Act, 1972, 
introduced a two-tier local government structure across England and Wales based on county 
and district councils, and six new Metropolitan County Councils (MCC) in the largest English 
conurbations to address key strategic planning and development issues (Table 1). The Herbert 
Commission had in fact recommended a more widely drawn area for the GLC, whilst a 
dissenting report by a member of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission, Derek Senior, had 
recommended ‘the creation of 35 city regions and 148 districts’ with a ‘map of 
recommendations for areas’ which ‘placed greater weight than the main report on patterns 
of economic activity and less on traditional units, believing that local authorities should be 
based on “the potential service and commuting hinterlands of a major centre for the functions 
associated with planning, transportation and development” (Sandford, 2019, p.7 citing Royal 
Commission on Local Government in England 1966-69b, p.20)  
 
Name of Metropolitan County Constituent Local Authorities (municipalities) 
Greater Manchester City of Manchester, City of Salford, Bolton, Bury, 
Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, 
Wigan  
Merseyside City of Liverpool, Knowsley, St. Helens, Sefton, 
Wirral 
South Yorkshire City of Sheffield, Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham 
Tyne and Wear City of Newcastle, City of Sunderland, Gateshead, 
South Tyneside, North Tyneside 
West Midlands City of Birmingham, City of Coventry, City of 
Wolverhampton, Dudley, Sandwell, Solihull, 
Walsall  
West Yorkshire City of Leeds, City of Bradford, City of Wakefield, 
Calderdale, Kirklees   
 
Table 1 – Metropolitan Counties in England, 1974 – 1986  
 
Under the new system, the MCCs provided a strategic overview and capacity to act in relation 
to: land use planning (through county structure plans), transportation, economic 
development, environmental enhancement & waste management - local planning was to be 
the responsibility of individual lower tier metropolitan districts.   
2.2 Smaller scales for a smaller state? - dismantling the metropolitan scale (1980s) 
 
The fracturing of the social democratic and Keynesian political-economic consensus and rise 
of ‘neoliberal’ perspectives promoting a smaller state in the 1970s saw planning increasingly 
perceived as a potential hindrance to the efficiency of land markets and the development 
industry.  The context was also challenging for regional policy, with state spatial policy in many 
countries focussing increasingly on ‘urban problems’ in the face of economic restructuring, 
mass unemployment and urban unrest (Couch et al., 2011; Demazière and Sykes, 2021). 
Regional policy in many countries became mainly concerned with ‘emergency’ interventions, 
leading Desjardins (2017: 66) to speak of ‘L’aménageur comme pompier’ (the regional planner 
as ‘firefighter’).  There was also an ideological undercurrent to these evolutions, notably in 
the UK, where regional policy was considered by elements of the government to be likely to 
be palliative at best, and at worst divert state resources from where they could be more 
precisely targeted to support productivity, or address market failure. Simultaneously, local 
government was frequently caricatured as an inefficient and potentially unruly entity, with 
the potential to disrupt central state strategy and policy agendas.  
Under the Conservative government, the MCCs and the GLC were abolished in 1986, 
with strategic and local planning powers being transferred to their former constituent local 
authorities. Some argued that this led to a loss of strategic overview, as interventions targeted 
more discrete areas and locations within conurbations, notably the large urban regeneration 
sites created by industrial restructuring (Couch et al., 2011). A new system of Unitary 
Development Plans (UDP) combined general/strategic (Part I) and more specific policies (Part 
2). The wider strategic dimension was to be provided by an informal system of collaboratively 
produced Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). Joint boards were also maintained to coordinate 
functions such as Policing, fire services, public transport and, in some areas, waste 
management. Despite this, it has been argued that there nevertheless emerged a ‘strategic 
policy vacuum’ (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 2007 p. 31). Inter-municipal cooperation 
kept the metropolitan scale ‘alive’ and provided some strategic thinking and a proto city 
regional institutional ecology took root in some places, notably Greater Manchester 
(Tomaney and McCarthy, 2015).   
 
2.3 Bigger is better? - the return of the ‘larger than local’ scale and the experiment in 
English regionalisation (1990 – 2010)   
 
When attention to ‘larger than local’ development issues re-emerged in the 1990s, this was 
with a scalar orientation towards large ‘standard regions’ rather than the metropolitan scale 
(Jones and McCleod, 1999).  The election of the Blair government in 1997, saw the creation 
of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) tasked with developing Regional Economic 
Strategies (RES) and Regional Assemblies to ostensibly oversee their work (Hall (2007) Shields 
and Wray, 2019). Devolution to Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland marked a significant 
constitutional change whilst the new Greater London Authority (GLA), with its power to make 
and adopt metropolitan-scale Spatial Development Strategy (SDS) – the London Plan; 
reintroduced the metropolitan scale of government in England’s capital for the first time since 
the 1980s. In 2004 the regional planning system was reinforced in England with statutory 
Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS) replacing advisory ‘Regional Planning Guidance’ (RPG). 
County Structure plans were abolished with Local Development Frameworks (LDF) being 
introduced having to accord with the relevant RSS for their region.  The RSS structure allowed 
for sub-regional plans to be prepared for relevant sub-areas such as city regions.  
 
Regionalisation was undermined, however, by difficulties in complementing the technocratic 
‘output’ problem solving legitimacy of regional planning with the ‘input’ legitimacy of the 
governed (Taylor, 2019). A referendum in 2004 saw the establishment of an elected regional 
assembly in the north east of England attacked by the populist press and decisively rejected 
by voters (Shaw and Robinson, 2007).  This led to greater attention to other scales such as the 
city region, the local government area, and the neighbourhood level.   
 
2.4 The ‘return of the city region’ (2000s – 2020)  
 
The ‘Urban Renaissance’ policy agenda (1997-2010) (Rogers, 1999), coupled with shifts 
towards reinvigorated urban economies, led to a ‘return of’ and ‘return to’ the city (Rae, 
2013). This reflected the wider trends within globalisation (Sassen, 1991), notably new rounds 
of urban-focussed accumulation (Harvey, 1989), and cultural movements (Florida, 2004). In 
England, there was a new acknowledgement of the economic, social, cultural importance of 
cities. City-regions were conceived as drivers of regional economies, change, innovation, and 
creativity in a more knowledge-based economy - though it was also suggested England’s ‘Core 
Cities’ were still not ‘punching their weight’ in comparison with Europe’s other leading 
regional cities (Parkinson et al., 2004).  Recalling the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, there 
was also attention to ‘functional’ geographies (e.g. Travel to Work Areas). At the same time 
the regional scale was being critiqued as too vast in comparison to sub-areas such as city-
regions, with increasing calls for more sub-regional organisation of local development. City 
regions were presented by their advocates as more coherent ‘larger than local’ spaces, with 
sufficient critical mass in economic, spatial management and governance terms, and greater 
potential for citizen identification. The economic and political case for city regions argued that 
they could both help bridge economic gaps across England and reboot the process of 
devolution and democratic engagement.  
 
The example of London, with its elected mayor and Greater London Assembly (GLA), and 
responsibilities for:  strategic spatial planning (with the creation of a London Plan; housing; 
transport (with a generously-funded transport authority, Transport for London); economic 
development; environment; Policing; fire and emergency planning; Culture/sport; health; 
and, energy, also served as an inspiration.    Elsewhere the city regional principle was reflected 
in the Northern Way Growth Strategy (NWGS) led by the three northern RDAs with the aim 
of bridging the £29 billion output gap between the north of England and the rest of the UK. 
This sought to promote partnership working in the North and was principally focussed on 











Region  City Regions 
North East England  Tees Valley                   
Tyne and Wear 
North West England  Central Lancashire 
Liverpool City Region 
Manchester City Region  
Yorkshire and the Humber Hull and Humber Ports 
Leeds City Region  
Sheffield City Region 
 
Table 2 – The Eight City Regions of the Northern Way Growth Strategy (2004) 
 
In the late-2000s Multi Area Agreements (MAAs) sought to foster cross-boundary working   
(Nurse, 2012), whilst in 2009 new legislation allowed the creation of new inter-municipal 
entities called ‘Combined Authorities’ (CAs). This paved the way for a return of ‘Harder city-
regional structures’ (Hodson et al., 2020, p. 203) in the following decade.   
 
2.5 Regions out, city regions in – post-2010 rescaling  
 
The 2010-2015 Coalition government introduced consequential changes to how sub-national 
development was scaled and administered, with stated aims of rebalancing the economy, 
reducing the budget deficit, and encouraging localism (Sturzaker and Nurse, 2020). Severe 
public spending cuts were enacted impacting the ability of local authorities to provide services 
and deliver a local policy agenda. The structures of regional economic and spatial planning 
were rapidly abolished (Nurse, 2015a) and economic development functions passed to sub-
regional Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), ostensibly centred on functional economic areas 
(DCLG, 2010a, DCLG, 2010b, Pugalis, 2011). This was a much finer geography, with 39 LEPs 
replacing the 8 English RDAs, many based on city regions. They could bid for ‘Growth Deals’ 
and were required to draw up multi-year strategic economic plans, setting out the priorities 
for long-term growth in their areas. Land use planning reverted to local planning authorities 
and in some places community, or business-led, neighbourhood plans were adopted.  
In 2011 came a series of ‘City Deals’ (DCLG, 2011), initially with the Core Cities1. These offered 
an increase in economic planning powers in return for referenda on changing their mode of 
governance towards having a directly elected executive mayor (this was rejected in all but 
one case, Bristol, in 2012) (Sandford, 2015).   
 
In 2011 the first sub-regional Combined Authority (CA) was created for Greater Manchester, 
generally seen as having been the most successful city region at sustaining inter-municipal 
city regional working after the abolition of metropolitan scale government in the mid-1980s. 
This ‘exemplar’ (Hodson et al., 2020, p.201) English city-region has been closely scrutinised by 
commentators (Jenkins, 2015), academic observers (Haughton et al., 2016) and those 
watching from other places (Parkinson et al., 2016). Further CAs were created in 2014 and 
2016 with these bodies acquiring devolved powers over economic and transport planning, 
and bringing together the leaders of each LEP’s constituent local authority districts as a means 
of restoring some accountability to sub-regional decision making (Nurse, 2015a).  
 
In June 2014, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced plans for what 
he termed the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ (NP) (Osborne, 2014).  This was underpinned by 
notions of urban agglomeration and aimed to rebalance the UK economy away from London 
and the South East. It primarily centred on the heavily urbanised east-west belt running from 
Liverpool, across Manchester, and over the Pennines to Leeds and Sheffield, as a place where 
it was argued that comparable economies of scale and agglomeration could be achieved 









                                                          
1 Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield 
and Glasgow and Cardiff - http://www.corecities.com/  
 
Figure 1 - The Sub-regions within the Northern Powerhouse  
Source: Alexander Nurse with ‘Office for National Statistics, 2011 Census: Digitized Boundary 
Data (England and Wales) [computer file]. UK DataService Census Support. Downloaded from: 
https://borders.ukdataservice.ac.uk/ 
The NP was to be realised through the negotiation of ‘devolution deals’ between the leaders 
of each city region and central government.  The basic ‘deal’ would be £900m spread over 30 
years to spend on local infrastructure projects, control over skills agendas, and the 
assumption of control over policing and fire services.  Extra powers and resources could also 
be negotiated, for example, Manchester secured a further £300m for housing, and in 2015 
assumed control over health spending (Sandford, 2020, pp.18-20).  Each city region was 
expected to introduce a directly elected ‘metro-mayor’ with the first elections in some areas 
taking place in 2017. Promises were also made of investment in infrastructure for expanded 
travel-to-work areas in the north, notably rail electrification, and a mooted high-speed east-
west rail link termed HS3. In time the NP was joined by the Midlands Engine and other similar 
initiatives.  
 
3.0 Situating city regionalism in England  
3.1 Developing themes of enquiry  
 
The recent evolutions outlined above amount to the biggest shift in how the largest English 
city regions are governed since 1986 and the abolition of the Metropolitan County Councils, 
but where do they fit in relation to the ‘global trend towards devolution’ (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Gill, 2003, p 336) of recent decades?  There are a number of themes within the wider 
literature on city regionalism and scale construction which have been reviewed and inform 
the identification of contemporary themes of enquiry in relation to the new city regionalism 
in England (Sections 3.2 – 3.6).  Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003, p.334) contend that in 
analysing processes of devolution, there are three factors which might be considered 
‘subnational legitimacy… decentralisation of authority and resources’. Jonas and Moisio 
(2018, p.351) meanwhile draw attention to the links between the rise of city regionalism and 
state interests and strategy arguing that ‘that city regionalism is becoming an important 
medium through which the state exercises its powers in the 21st century’. Similarly, Sturzaker 
and Nurse (2020) situate their account of the evolution and rescaling of planning and urban 
governance in the UK within a framework that relationally connects episodes of rescaling and 
institution building at lower scales with the policy agendas and strategies pursued by central 
government. Given that city regionalism is shaped by such strategising and the interests of 
different actors at different scales, the question arises of who is privileged by processes of 
rescaling (Jessop, 1990, Beel et al., 2018)? This relates to the question of the degree 
subnational legitimacy (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003) which newly configured scales may 
accrue. Notably whether new territorial configurations like city regions can build democratic 
‘input’ legitimacy and support from the governed (e.g. in the form of engagement with events 
like elections), as well as the ‘output’ legitimacy in terms of results (e.g. raising 
competitiveness; addressing challenges of sustainable development etc.) which is often cited 
by states, local actors, and professionals as a justification for their creation (Taylor, 2019).   
 
The interrelated issues outlined above also reinforce Jonas and Moisio’s (2018) conclusion 
that ‘city regionalism is a contingent expression of wider territorial-political dilemmas 
confronting the national state which are partly informed by, but not reducible to, global 
neoliberal logics of economic growth and competition’ (p.366).  They also echo in debates 
surrounding the New Regionalism and New Economic Geography in the 1990s and 2000s 
where some accounts were accused of ‘following a functionalist discourse of globalisation 
backed up by neoliberalism’ with ‘regional analysis’ being ‘shrouded in a crude economism 
exhibiting little imaginative under-standing of local structures of feeling, [and] place-based 
identities’ (MacLeod and Jones, 1999, p.670). In response Lovering (1999, p. 393) called for ‘a 
renewed emphasis on careful theoretical work’ and ‘more discriminating empirical studies’. 
Work at the time which did empirically explore the emergence of regional institutions, such 
as that by Burch and Holliday (1993), pointed to the importance of ‘voluntaristic’ action by 
local actors and ‘the role of personality and circumstance’ in such processes (pp. 46-47; 49). 
More recently, Sturzaker and Nurse (2020), have similarly emphasised, that the form city 
regionalism takes in a given context emerges from an interplay of wider forces, the distinctive 
histories of sub-state territorial governance in different states, and the experience of specific 
city regional territories.   Recognising such issues, the themes below are informed by the 
wider literature on city regions, but also ‘inductively’ derived from the evolving English 
situation. They are briefly reviewed below before the paper moves on to reflect on the case 





3.2 City regional governance in England and the state (is it here to stay?).  
 
The English case provides striking evidence to support the idea that accounts of the 
emergence of city regions need to consider the strategising and interests of the state in which 
they are situated (Moisio and Jonas, 2018). Taking a ‘long view’ of the history of frequent 
rescaling in England, for example, it is clear that the state at different times has seen an 
interest in promoting, or discouraging, the emergence of institutions and governing capacity 
at city regional scale. An initial theme of enquiry when considering the new city regionalism 
in England then is whether the metropolitan city-regional scale is ‘here to stay’ this time? Will 
it be the ‘scale of the century’, or just of a decade at most, in-keeping with past cycles of sub-
national rescaling and searches for new ‘spatial-fixes’ (Harvey, 1981)? Many of the new CA 
boundaries in the larger urban areas bear a striking geographical resemblance to those of the 
MCCs (Table 1 above) even though functional and Travel to Work Areas have expanded since 
the 1970s.  Devolution in England remains active, even if other scales and territories have vied 
for attention in recent years, notably the UK state scale since the 2016 EU referendum 
(Sturzaker and Nurse, 2020) and the territories of UK-subsumed territories like Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The growing number of CAs, signing of devolution deals, and discursive 
staying power of the NP initiative, however, suggest that the city regional agenda is here to 
stay in England, for the time being at least.  
 
3.3 Legitimacy and citizen ‘buy-in’ to the new city-regional scale.  
 
As noted above, one theme that Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003, p.334) contend is important 
in analysing processes of devolution is ‘subnational legitimacy’. Here it can be observed that, 
whilst the political and legislative basis of CAs and devolution ‘deals’ seems quite resilient, its 
local ‘input’ political legitimacy (Taylor, 2019) still appears weak. In bringing forward the CAs, 
the 2010–2015 coalition sought to bolster the legitimacy of a process largely informed by the 
economic and business focused LEPs (Pugalis and Fisher, 2011)  through direct elections for 
CA mayors. However, voter turnouts in the first elections held for CA mayors in some areas in 
2017 were disappointingly low for those hoping to see a reinvigoration of representative 
democratic participation at a strategic ‘larger than local’ scale (Table 3). Though it is true that 
voter turnouts for local elections in England are generally low compared to many other parts 
of Europe (Wilks-Heeg and Clayton, 2006), this was still an indicator of low citizen ‘buy-in’ to 
the new scale.  








Ballots at the 
count 
Turnout (%) 
Cambridgeshire & Peterborough 
(C&P) 
204,302 33.6% 
Greater Manchester 573,543 28.9% 
Liverpool City Region 291,449 26.1% 
Tees Valley 103,767 21.3% 
West Midlands 523,201 26.7% 
West of England 199,519 29.7% 
Total 1.9m 27.8% 
However, legitimacy may not simply be derived from the input of electoral events, but as 
Schmidt (2013) notes through ‘throughput’ legitimacy derived from more ongoing citizen 
engagement in governing decisions. In some places (notably Greater Manchester) there is 
emerging evidence that a ‘hardening’ of city regional governance structures and notably the 
introduction of statutory spatial planning at the metropolitan scale has potential to create an 
arena through which citizens might engage more ‘disruptively’ in city regional politics and 
agenda setting than was the case under previous more informal ‘public-private’ city regional 
‘regime led’ governing arrangements (Hodson et al., 2020, p.214).   
 
3.4 Spatial selectivity and planning  
 
The spatial selectivity of city regional agendas and the inter-regional city regionally focussed 
initiatives like the NP (Nurse, 2015b), with their apparent focus on larger urban places,  raises 
issues at a time when smaller so-called ‘left behind’ towns and areas are in political focus 
(Halliday and Walker, 2020). Here again the city regional agenda becomes enmeshed with 
state strategy and power projection (Jonas and Moisio, 2018). Notably in the English context 
it must sit alongside the national government’s sponsorship of an agenda for towns and 
smaller places – one which has rapidly become mired in accusations of cronyism political ‘pork 
barrelling’ (Knott, 2021).   
 
At the intra-city regional scale there are also questions about how city regional agendas can 
be advanced coherently and consensually if there are trade-offs to be made between 
different areas - between central cities and peripheral cities/towns, peri-urban and rural areas 
etc.? New inter-scalar relations and tensions may arise around how a wider, or ‘aggregate’, 
city regional interest is defined and pursued, especially if any constituent sub-areas feel it not 
to be in their best interests - e.g. the development of major infrastructure schemes, or key 
sites, which lie on the territory of given municipalities within a city region.  
 
One arena and mechanism through which these issues may be addressed is through spatial 
planning at city regional scale as a key facet of the institutional ‘hardening’ of this scale 
(Hodson et al., 2020).  The return of the city since the 1990s has led to regrowth and processes 
of re-urbanisation (Dembski et al., 2019) and regeneration, which have seen many major 
urban centres near saturation in terms of the remaining land/sites available for development 
(O'Brien and Matthews, 2015). Consequently their surrounding city-regional spaces are 
increasingly seen as yielding viable sites to continue urban growth agendas. But aligning the 
interests of different constituent territories and citizens, and seeking consensus around a 
strategic vision and planning policy at city-regional scale can be challenging. The first 
campaign for the election of city-regional mayor Greater Manchester in 2017, for example, 
became politicised around the emerging Greater Manchester Spatial Framework (GMSF) and 
proposals for revisions to Green Belt designations (Fitzgerald, 2017). As Moisio and Jonas  
(2018) note ‘bringing together systems of governance and city-regions is often characterized 
by political struggles and heated contestation’ and ‘The same applies to the tailoring of city-
regional spatial planning systems which would deal with issues such as land use, 
transportation, housing or economic development’. Given that the model and scope of the 
renewed metropolitan spatial planning varies between city regions, one theme of enquiry 
might be how this interacts with and perhaps shapes the tone and capacity of spatial 
governance at this scale.  
 
 
3.5 Austerity  
 
Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003, p.334) contend one factor to be considered in analysing 
processes of devolution is the ‘decentralisation of authority and resources’.  The city regional 
agenda in England in the 2010s has evolved against the background of the wider impacts of 
the socially regressive austerity cuts which have been made to the budgets of many of the 
local governments which constitute the CAs in the 2010–2020 period. Whilst the 
entrepreneurial orientation of evolving city-regional governance can lead to bullish claims 
being made about future prospects – for example, the ‘heroic GVA growth assumptions of 
2.5% year on year’ in the draft GMSF (Hodson et al., p. 206); these sit alongside the reality for 
many municipalities of deep cuts to core budgets.  Such cuts have hit many places in the north 
of England hardest (Centre for Cities, 2019). Though devolution deals bring a certain amount 
of new resources to the CA areas  (Pidd, 2020), the underlying picture is one where their 
constituent authorities’ core budgets have often been heavily reduced.   
 
3.6 The ‘European question’  
 
The city regional agenda has had to evolve against the backdrop of the consequences of the 
UK’s referendum on membership of the European Union in 2016. Here again state level 
processes and interests set the context for the city regional agenda. The ‘great majority of 
available evidence suggests that Brexit is likely to make the UK’s interregional inequalities 
worse than they already are’ (Billing et al., 2019 p. 757). It also modifies the opportunity 
structures of place-based policy, given the large role that the EU has played in regional policy 
in the UK over the past 40 years (Sykes and Schulze-Bäing, 2017).   
 
Engagement with the European context has also been a driver of much thinking about city 
regions in England in the 2000s and 2010s, including that of central government. Research 
has demonstrated that ‘countries that have high-performing cities beyond the capital city also 
have higher-performing and better balanced economies’ (Parkinson, 2019, p.105). And EU 
support has not just been significant in quantitative financial terms, but has had other 
qualitative elements which have boosted place-making and governance potential, such as the 
stability of multiannual funding programmes and, relatedly, the enhanced autonomy that 
comes with having a dedicated and ‘independent’ source of support with which to engage in 
negotiations with other actors (e.g. national government and the private sector).  These 
attributes have been particularly significant in the context of the austerity mentioned above 
(Nurse and Fulton, 2017). 
 
In the wake of the 2016 EU Referendum the pursuit of national scale industrial policy (Mance 
and Bounds, 2016) came to the fore, but as some have noted this is not a substitute for more 
place-based forms of policy (Industrial Communities Alliance, 2017). Questions remain too 
about how well-tailored new Local Industrial Strategies (LISs) aligned to national sectoral 
goals will be to the place-based potential of different territories (Billing et al., 2019; Nurse 
and Sykes, 2020), or even if these documents will be retained (Hill, 2021). A replacement for 
the EU Cohesion Policy following ‘Brexit’ is to be called the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) 
(Wells, 2020) which has raised concerns about recentralisation of funding. Combined with the 
accusations of political favouritism and lack of objectivity associated with other funds 
ostensibly dedicated to ‘levelling-up’ and the development of towns (Knott, 2021) this means 
that the funding context for city regional development remains uncertain and contested.   
  
The remaining sections of this paper explore the themes above in the context of the Liverpool 
City Region (LCR) and its new city regional Combined Authority.  
 
4.0 The new city regionalism in practice – some scenes from Liverpool 
4.1 Context 
 
Liverpool is the main city of a conurbation of approximately 1.5 million people. Most of this 
is within the metropolitan county of Merseyside which had a Metropolitan County Council 
(MCC) from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s. At that time, against a complex backdrop of 
long term social and economic decline (Cocks, 2010, Couch, 2017, Murden, 2006, Parkinson, 
2019, Sykes et al., 2013, Shaw and Sykes, 2016), municipal governance in Liverpool was 
tumultuous. Local leaders of the ‘Militant’ tendency pursued a policy of municipal 
development at odds with the financial restraints imposed by the central government of 
Margaret Thatcher (Parkinson, 1985, Frost and North, 2013). The abolition of MCC in 1986 
removed the metropolitan scale of comprehensive government, though joint authorities 
remained to coordinate transport, waste, policing, and fire services. The MCC had also 
prepared a structure plan (Merseyside County Council, 1979) which promoted urban 
regeneration and set out a Green Belt for the metropolitan area (Dockerill and Sturzaker, 
2019). The need for regeneration in the 1980s led to the creation of the central government 
initiative, the Merseyside Development Corporation, whose remit covered much of the inner 
urban areas of the conurbation including large areas of dockland and waterfront.  
 
As the 1990s dawned the agenda of new leadership in the core city of Liverpool was to ‘make 
the place normal’ (Leader of Liverpool City Council, Harry Rimmer, cited in Parkinson, 2019, 
p.47). The decade was also characterised by vision and strategy making at the metropolitan 
scale driven by the designation of the area as an EU Cohesion Policy ‘Objective One’ region. 
This status reflected the fact that GDP per capita in the sub-region was below 75% the average 
of that in the then EU 15 states. To access the large sums of support available from the EU to 
address this situation, the local authorities and their partners in the city region were required 
to work together to define strategic objectives at the city regional scale (Parkinson, 2019; 
Sykes et al., 2013). As well as the high level of funding for initiatives to support the social, 
environmental and economic recovery and development of the area, this need to work in a 
coordinated manner provided a considerable fillip to partnership and joint-working.  
 
Major programmes of EU support were renewed in the 2000s helping the city region and its 
people to develop in social, economic, physical and environmental terms, with the progress 
being marked symbolically by the award of the status of European Capital of Culture (ECoC) 
2008 to Liverpool. The early years of preparing this were beset by instability and resignations 
at the Liverpool Culture Company set-up to deliver the event (O’Brien, 2011). But the city and 
its partners turned things around dramatically and ECoC 2008 delivered an extensive cultural 
programme and an estimated £753.8 million in additional direct visitor spend across 
Liverpool, Merseyside and the wider north west region (Garcia et al., 2010). ECoC 2008 also 
contributed to a positive shift in perceptions of Liverpool and Merseyside, both within the 
area and beyond (García, 2010). The expectations of some commentators that Liverpool 
would not be able to successfully deliver were confounded.  However, the wider context for 
the city’s development was again changing with the global financial and economic crisis 
ushering in new more challenging times. Despite this, Parkinson argues that in 2010 it was 
clear that ‘Liverpool had had a very good decade’ even if a new ‘age of austerity’ had arrived 
(2019, p.96; pp.110-114). The following paragraphs examine the subsequent decade through 
the lens of the themes on the new English city regionalism outlined above.  
  
4.2 The new city regional governance and Liverpool 
 
A significant feature of the ECoC 2008 programme was that, whilst it was clearly centred on 
Liverpool, it also had a sub-regional dimension with other parts of the city region hosting 
events. This demonstrated that action branded under the name of the ‘core’ city of Liverpool 
could successfully generate benefits across the wider area. Of the Metropolitan County 
Councils created in the 1970s (Table 1 above) only one had featured the name of the core city 
in its title - ‘Greater Manchester’, with ‘Merseyside’ being used as the title of the conurbation 
on the river.  This was to change in the 2010s with the creation of the Liverpool City Region 
CA in 2014.   
Another significant development in local governing arrangements was the creation of an 
elected mayor for the core city of Liverpool. Referenda on the creation of elected mayors for 
the Core Cities in 2012 had resulted in only one positive result in Bristol. However, in Liverpool 
the city council voted to adopt the mayoral model in return for a City Deal in 2012 (Nurse, 
2015). There are mixed views about the position of directly-elected ‘Mayor of Liverpool’. The 
first incumbent, Joe Anderson of the Labour Party, has faced severe challenges to developing 
a forward-looking agenda due to the austerity imposed on the city in the 2010s, but there is 
also a recognition that the elected mayoral model has ‘provided clearer leadership, engaged 
the private sector, built links with government and raised the profile of the city nationally and 
internationally’ (Parkinson, 2019, p.104)i.  Significantly the position was already in existence 
when the new Liverpool City Region (LCR) Combined Authority (LCRCA) was established in 
2014, and the Mayor of Liverpool had been in place for five years by the time a City Regional 
Mayor was elected in 2017. The LCRCA is thus one of two where there is both a directly-
elected mayor for the core city and the wider city region/CA area. This illustrates well Hodson 
et al.’s (2020, p.204) observation that ‘Re-scaling to English city-regions involves some re-
design of governance even while other pre-existing institutional structures and arrangements 
remain’.    
 
The LCRCA comprises the six original local authority districts of the MCC - Liverpool, Knowsley, 
Sefton, St Helens, Wirral, and the additional area of Halton.  Initially the democratic leadership 
of the CA was provided by a City Region Cabinet comprising the political leaders from each 
local authority district, with one of their number being elected as leader.  When the LCRCA 
came into being on the 1st of April 2014, an immediate point of potential contention arose in 
the new governance of the city region.  The Mayor of Liverpool, Joe Anderson, argued that 
his national profile as the mayor of a Core City meant that he should lead the City Region 
Cabinet. This was in contrast to the convention seen in other CAs where a non-core city 
district had taken on the leadership to ensure balance between the core and periphery 
(Nurse, 2015a). Though Anderson eventually backed down, and the LCRCA was initially led by 
Phil Davies, the leader of the neighbouring local authority of Wirral, this bumpy start did not 
ease a fractious relationship between the City of Liverpool and the wider city region (Nurse, 
2015b).  
 
The LCRCA proceeded for the next year with its remit of delivering a transport and economic 
growth agenda, before the next step in the devolution agenda saw the adoption of bespoke 
‘Devolution Deals’ in 2014 which transferred further powers over economic and transport 
budgeting, in return for the establishment of an elected ‘Metro Mayor’ for the city region 
(Sandford, 2019).  Given that the LCR is a stronghold of the Labour Party, and that its 
candidate would be effectively ensured of victory, much attention was given to a primary 
process to select its candidate (Nurse and Sturzaker, 2020).  As in other CAs the primary came 
down to a battle of local candidates versus those with a national profile, with Mayor of 
Liverpool Joe Anderson taking on two national Labour Members of Parliament - Luciana 
Berger and Steve Rotheram. Steve Rotheram was selected as the candidate and elected a LCR 
Mayor in 2017.   
 
Much of Rotheram’s early period in office was characterised by ongoing tensions between 
the core city and its periphery – not least the ambiguity and overlap between his role and that 
of the Mayor of Liverpool.  Building upon his election manifesto (Rotheram, 2016) and areas 
of power, Rotheram sought to place a greater focus on the districts within the city region, 
championing a town centre fund and placing a heavy focus on a skills agenda particularly 
relevant to the peripheral districts.  Elsewhere, he mirrored priorities of other candidates for 
elected CA mayoralties, appointing a Cycling Commissioner to champion the delivery of active 
travel, and also linking with other metro mayors including the Mayor of Greater Manchester, 
Andy Burnham, to champion strategic transport reform including pushing for the 
renationalisation of Northern Rail – which provides key links between Liverpool, Manchester, 
Leeds and beyond.   
 
Reviewing the situation at the end of the decade, Parkinson emphasises that ‘building 
identity, collaboration and trust in a city region is easy to aspire to and difficult to achieve’ 
and that the LCR has made progress, with ‘commitment and confidence’ being ‘higher’. 
Though he also observes that ‘in terms of capacity to deliver and commitment to the city 




4.3 Legitimacy and citizen ‘buy-in’ 
 
As noted already, citizen engagement with the new city-regional governance is a key question 
which looms in the background of the city-regional movement in England. In Greater 
Manchester, it has been argued by some that the creation of this new arena (notably with 
links to spatial planning) has helped to disrupt (to an extent) established modes of ‘public-
private’ regime-based city-regional governing (Hodson et al., 2020). Yet the GM city-regional 
mayoral elections in 2017 only attracted a turnout of 28.9% whilst in the LCR, Steve Rotheram 
may have been elected with 59% of the vote, but this was on a 26.1% turnout (Table 4) (the 
election for the Mayor of Liverpool in 2016 had a slightly higher turnout of 30.9%).  
 
Authority % Turnout LCRCA Mayoral Election, 
2017 
Rank Turnout in  
LCRCA Mayoral Election, 2017 
Liverpool 28.6% 1 
Wirral 27.8% 2 
Sefton 26.9% 3 
St. Helens 22.9% 4 
Knowsley 22.7% 5 
Halton 20.5 6 
Overall  26.1% - 
 
Table 4 – Percentage and rank of turnout by local authority in Liverpool City Region Mayoral 
election   
 
The figures in Table 4 also show that there is a certain ‘fade’ effect in terms of turnout from 
the core city of Liverpool (28.6%) to the peripheral area of Halton (20.5%). Overall, turnout 
levels were higher in the core city of Liverpool and the more coastal and central authorities 
of Wirral and Sefton, than in the eastern and southern parts of the city region.  New elections 
for the offices of both Mayor of Liverpool and LCRCA Mayor are due to be held in May 2021. 
These will generate new figures on turnout which it will be instructive to compare with figures 
from earlier polls. 
4.4 Spatial selectivity and planning 
 
A task of governance at the city-regional scale, where a competence for spatial planning is 
attributed, is that of exercising spatial selectivity as regards the growth and kinds of 
development which will be sought in different parts of the territory (Hodson et al., 2020).  This 
can be a complex process which brings together the city regional authorities, local authorities 
(typically with local planning competences), private developers, the public, and special 
interest civil society groups. The model of spatial planning at the city-regional scale in England 
varies - for example, the role of the GMSF is different from that of the Spatial Development 
Strategy (SDS) being prepared in the LCR. The GMSF and the West of England Spatial Plan 
prepared for the West of England CA area have the status of a joint local plan, are based on 
local plan legislation, and are notably able to address the often-controversial issue of 
Greenbelt allocations. The SDS for the LCR is based on the regulations for the London SDS and 
has been described as a ‘lighter touch and strategic approach’ (LCR Planner, interview with 
authors, March 2020). Given that the latest iteration of the SDS for London (the ‘London Plan’) 
was completed in 14 months, there is some optimism that this model will facilitate a less 
drawn out process than that experienced in GM.  
 
The SDS model in the LCR still addresses housing numbers for the CA territory, but can also 
incorporate emergent themes like climate change, public health and social inclusion, 
providing a context for local plans and Supplementary Development Documents (SDPs) to 
address these issues. The LCRCA is also the only CA which has development management 
powers and is a statutory consultee on local planning decisions - though it is recognised such 
powers need to be deployed with sensitivity to the views of the constituent local authorities.  
The LCRA also has ‘call in powers’ to review local planning decisions, but these can only be 
used with the consent of the leader of the local authority concerned. The SDS can only be 
adopted by unanimity of the leaders of the six LCR local authorities and the CA mayor.  
 
There was some reticence at first regarding city regional spatial planning, with the Mayor of 
the LCR being conscious of how politicised and complex the process had become in GM 
around the GMSF and the Greenbelt issue. Proposed revisions to the Greenbelt have also 
proved controversial in parts of the LCR (Dockerill and Sturzaker, 2019), but as they are still 
dealt with as a local planning matter this has not yet impacted on the wider SDS process in 
the same manner. Among the suite of strategies that the CA can produce, the SDS is the only 
one with real regulatory weight which means it has been seen, alongside the power to control 
some funding, as one of the levers which the Mayor of the LCR can use to promote his 
manifesto.  
 
Within the LCRCA there are regular Chief Planners Meetings, to which neighbouring West 
Lancashire and Warrington are also invited. There are also meetings with authorities on the 
borders of the LCR reflecting Parkinson’ (2019, p.106) observation that the city region is not 
‘hermetically sealed’ and that ‘many of its residents’ work outside it and many who live 
outside travel to work in it.  So far, the experience of renewed city-regional spatial planning 
has not generated the controversy seen in other CA areas around new plans, and seems to 
have succeeded in demonstrating its relevance to key political figures. It will be interesting to 
witness to what extent it achieves a higher profile in subsequent elections for the Mayor of 
the LCR, and whether the consensual atmosphere which seems to reign at present around 
strategic planning in this stereotypically fractious city region will be maintained once the SDS 
begins to exert more influence over spatially selective decisions. Previously, for example, 
there were some tensions, around the strategic Liverpool Waters mixed-use development 
scheme located in Liverpool when attempts by the leaders of the LCR LEP to intervene in the 
process were firmly rebuffed by Mayor Anderson, citing the primacy of Liverpool City 
Council’s planning powers (Nurse, 2015a).    
 
4.5 Austerity  
 
Despite the progress in institution building outlined above and the resources brought by city 
and devolution ‘deals’ to Liverpool and the LCR, no account of these developments can ignore 
the ‘lost decade’ (Toynbee and Walker, 2020) of austerity which has marked  the country and 
city since 2010.  Cuts to local budgets precipitated the turbulent politics of Liverpool in the 
1980s, pushing it to ‘the brink’ of political and financial collapse (Parkinson, 1985), and in the 
2010s ‘it can be argued that the impact of the government’s cuts on the city’s finances has 
been greater and more difficult to manage than those faced by the Militant Labour council in 
the 1980s’ (Parkinson, 2019, p.110). The facts bear out such analysis, as ‘When adjusted for 
inflation, Liverpool City Council has £436 million less to spend per year now than it did in 2010, 
which equates to a 63 percent cut in its overall budget’ (Liverpool City Council, 2020). The 
‘Government’s own figures show Liverpool’s Spending Power has reduced by a cumulative 
21.3% in 2019/20 compared to 2010/11’ when ‘average reduction for all English authorities 
over this period was 10.2%’ (Liverpool City Council, 2020). Overall, Liverpool has had the 
biggest cut in its funding of all the Core Cities and in the LCR ‘this cut was matched by 
Knowsley. So the two city region authorities with that were the highest ranked in the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation received disproportionately heavy cuts to their funding from central 
government’ (Parkinson, 2019, p.110). Set against the scale of such cuts and those to come, 
in 2020, Liverpool City Council alone, needed to find another £19 million in savings and a 
further £25 million in 2021. Since 2010 it has also lost more than 2,500 staff (Liverpool City 
Council, 2020). The additional £30 million annually for 30 years for the wider LCR under its 
2016 ‘Devolution Deal’ to be added to repackaged existing funding seems modest indeed in 
the face of such deep cuts.  
 
4.6 The European Question  
 
The rising profile of city regions in England is part of the wider experience of city-regional 
development and governance in Europe (Demazière et al., 2020). But in Liverpool the 
‘European question’ has a particular salience, being and bound-up with the identity and 
history of the city in the latter decades of the 20th. Century, and forming a cornerstone of the 
narrative of how the city fought back against the doctrine of ‘managed decline’ discussed by 
some at the highest levels of the Thatcher regime in the 1980s (BBC News, 2011).  The EU 
invested significant resources into Merseyside. The 2000-2006 EU Objective One programme, 
for example, saw £840 million (Network for Europe, n.d.) flow into the area, which with 
‘match funding’ gave a total investment of over £1 billion over 6-7 years (compare this with 
LCRCA’s devolution ‘deal’ worth £900 million over thirty years). Parkinson (2019, p. 65) 
concludes that for a place like Liverpool ‘the sheer scale of EU Objective 1 funding caused a 
step-change in its confidence and gave its leaders the stability of funding over a long period 
of plan for change’. As a result, ‘Huge progress was made in a relatively short space of time’ 
and it ‘moved from a vulnerable post-imperial to a stronger more diverse economy embracing 
knowledge, science and innovation, culture and tourism’.  But the European question is about 
far more than funding levels and the economy for Liverpool, but about a renewal of 
governance culture, confidence, and a distinct identity, and it came as little surprise when the 
city voted heavily to stay in the EU in the 2016 EU referendum (Nurse and Sykes, 2019).  
 
8.0 Conclusion   
  
The evolution of city regionalism in England in bound-up with successive cycles of rescaling of 
sub-state government which have sought to provide institutions at the ‘right scale’ and with 
the right powers, but which have often stalled due to lack of finance, or been reversed by 
subsequent national legislative changes and policies. It provides an operative example of 
Jonas and Moisio’s (2018, p.351) contention ‘that city regionalism is becoming an important 
medium through which the state exercises its powers in the 21st century’. The case of the 
Metropolitan Councils which existed from the 1970s into the 1980s illustrates this well, 
demonstrating the mutable quality of institutions and scales of government in a polity without 
a constitutionally established structure of governance levels. A scale of government can be 
brought into being, or abolished, quickly with little, or no meaningful consultation, through 
an Act of Parliament, or executive action, often depending on the political and ideological 
agenda, of the government of the day. The experiment in English regionalisation in the 1990s 
and 2000s, was summarily terminated thus by an incoming government in 2010.    
 
In the past decade England’s experimentation with sub-state governance settled on the scalar 
fix of sub-regional territories such as city-regions, argued to better reflect ‘functional’ 
geographies (e.g. Travel to work areas; transport; housing and labour markets) than more 
expansive regional territories. Again, state strategy has promoted this, but the powerful 
bottom-up dynamics which have also been at play at different times, and in different places 
must also be acknowledged. These have drawn on legacies stretching back to the 1990s which 
saw varied efforts by local authorities, business interests and others to work together to 
create metropolitan/city regional governance capacity – for example, the ‘Manchester model’ 
of city-regional cooperation made it an exemplar for others, and ensured that city region was 
at the front of the queue for new institutional arrangements in the 2010s.  
   
Other drivers of devolution to English city regions include the economic objective of 
addressing regional imbalances in England (the ‘North-South’ divide and its variants). The new 
structures are the product of an ongoing process of searching for the next ‘larger than local’ 
‘spatial fix’ to resolve these issues. Today inter-municipal cooperation is being advanced 
through Combined Authorities (CAs), some led by elected Mayors. These are able to negotiate 
devolution ‘deals’ with central government. In the north of England such institutional change 
has taken place against the backdrop of the Northern Powerhouse initiative. Yet though sub-
state devolution is still on the agenda in England, it also faces some competition from more 
centrally driven initiatives such as the ‘national’ (UK) industrial strategy and its requirement 
for Local Industrial Strategies which reflect its themes (Nurse and Sykes, 2020).  That the latter 
may now apparently be shelved despite the effort and resources invested in their 
development (Hills, 2021) is again an illustration of how state centralism calls the shots in the 
English/UK polity and can reshape policy agendas and resource allocations overnight.  
 
As noted earlier, Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003, p.334) contend that it is important to 
consider ‘subnational legitimacy’ when analysing processes of devolution. Whilst the 
devolution agenda ostensibly dovetails well with the spatial economic concerns and initiatives 
discussed above and has a clear legislative basis, it remains uncertain how, or whether, it will  
reinvigorate citizen engagement in the face of desperately low levels of voter participation in 
democratic processes at sub-state scales. The turnouts for the first elections for CA mayors in 
2017 - when fewer than a third of eligible voters participated (Fig. 1) - suggest there is some 
way to go in securing the sought-after citizen ‘buy-in’ to the new sub-state scalar settlement.  
Centralist tendencies in the ‘Brexit’ state (Ward, 2020), and accusations that the allocations 
of funding made in lieu of lost EU investments in different territories are politically motivated 
(Bounds and Smith, 2021), may yet further undermine the sense that meaningful authority 
and autonomy is vested at the devolved scale.  
  
The new structures also need to address the issue of spatial selectivity, and the question of 
how to reconcile the interests of complex and diverse territories at the intra-city regional level 
- for example, ‘core city’ and wider ‘city regional’ agendas. The return of strategic spatial 
planning in some city regions provides one possible arena of tension here - for example, if CAs 
take decisions from a perspective of a strategic/collective wider territorial interest, such as 
releasing Greenbelt land for housing, or planning infrastructure development, which 
particularly affect and/or prove unpopular in certain sub-territories of a city region. It is the 
attribution of powers over greenbelt allocations to the GM city region which has led to 
planning there being perceived as a higher stakes and hence more political affair than in the 
LCRA. How spatial planning is configured at city regional level thus may not only define 
parameters of possible action as regards planning agendas, but also influence the wider 
nature of debate and spatial governance processes.  
 
Finally, echoing previous studies and the debates of the 1990s and 2000s around New 
Regionalism and the importance of local specificity in institutional emergence (Section 3.2 
above), the case of Liverpool and the LCRCA reminds us that configurations of the new city-
regional governance are also strongly shaped by place-based, historically rooted factors. Local 
political cultures differ from place to place making it hard to always ‘read off’ changes simply 
from wider structural forces and state strategy. For example, the new CAs in the proximate 
city regions of Liverpool and Manchester illustrate the influence of institutional and political 
management differences within the same polity.  In the LCR there are two executive Mayors 
(for the core city of Liverpool and the LCR) who can both claim an electoral mandate, creating 
scope for in-built competition. Differing institutional configurations and competences at a 
more local level thus interact to generate particular political and policy dynamics. Ultimately, 
whilst ‘rescaling’ is often considered from the perspective of wider structural ‘exogenous’ 
political-economic shifts and state strategies, we should not forget that the places it affects 
have their own distinctive contexts and histories which shape the material practices of 
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i The Mayor of Liverpool, Joe Anderson, was arrested in December 2020 as part of a Police investigation into 
building contracts in the city and subsequently stepped-down (Turner-LE and Thorp, 2020; Thorp, 2020). The 
contest to secure the Labour Party nomination to stand for election as Mayor of Liverpool in 2021 has also 
been mired in political controversy (Pidd and Wolfe-Robinson, 2021) and in March 2021 a critical government 
inspector’s report into aspects of governance and management at Liverpool City Council was published (Caller, 
2021).  
                                                          
